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In the secretary problem of Cayley (1875) and Moser (1956), n non-negative, independent, random variables
with common distribution are sequentially presented to a decision maker who decides when to stop and
collect the most recent realization. The goal is to maximize the expected value of the collected element.
In the k-choice variant, the decision maker is allowed to make k ď n selections to maximize the expected
total value of the selected elements. Assuming that the values are drawn from a known distribution with
finite support, we prove that the best regret—the expected gap between the optimal online policy and its
offline counterpart in which all n values are made visible at time 0—is uniformly bounded in the number of
candidates n and the budget k. Our proof is constructive: we develop an adaptive Budget-Ratio policy that
achieves this performance. The policy selects or skips values depending on where the ratio of the residual
budget to the remaining time stands relative to multiple thresholds that correspond to middle points of the
distribution. We also prove that being adaptive is crucial: in general, the minimal regret among non-adaptive
policies grows like the square root of n. The difference is the value of adaptiveness.
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1. Introduction
In the classic formulation of the secretary problem a decision maker (referred to as “she”) is
sequentially presented with n non-negative, independent, values representing the ability of potential
candidates and must select one candidate (referred to as “he”). Every time a new candidate is
inspected and his ability is revealed, the decision maker must decide whether to reject or select the
candidate, and her decision is irrevocable. If the candidate is selected, then the problem ends; if
the candidate is rejected, then he cannot be recalled at a later time. The decision maker knows the
number of candidates n, the distribution of the ability values in the population, and her objective
is to maximize the probability of selecting the most able candidate. For any given n the problem
can be solved by dynamic programming, but there is an asymptotically optimal heuristic that is
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remarkably elegant. The decision maker observes the abilities of the first n{e candidates and selects
the first candidate whose ability exceeds that of the current best candidate; or the last candidate
if no such candidate exists (see, e.g., Lindley 1961, Chow et al. 1964, Gilbert and Mosteller 1966,
Louchard and Bruss 2016)
Several variations of this simple model have been introduced in the literature, and we refer
to Freeman (1983) and Ferguson (1989) for a survey of extensions and references. Relevant to
us is the formulation in which the decision maker seeks to maximize the expected ability of the
selected candidate, rather than maximizing the probability of selecting the best. This problem
was first considered by Cayley (1875) and Moser (1956), and it is a special case of the k-choice
(multi-secretary) problem we study here. In our formulation:
• candidate abilities are independent, identically distributed, and supported on a finite set;
• the decision maker is allowed to select up to k candidates (k is the recruiting budget); and
• the decision maker’s goal is to maximize the expected total ability of the selected candidates.
This multi-secretary problem has applications in revenue management and auctions, among others.
In the standard capacity-allocation revenue management problem a firm sells k items (e.g. airplane
seats) to n customers from a discrete set of fare classes over a finite horizon and wishes to allocate
the seats in the best possible way (see, e.g., Kleywegt and Papastavrou 1998, Talluri and van Ryzin
2004). In auctions, the decision maker observes arriving bids and must decide whether to allocate
one of the available k items to an arriving customer (see, e.g., Kleinberg 2005, Babaioff et al. 2007).
The performance of any online algorithm for this k-choice secretary problem is bounded above
by the offline (or posterior) sort: the decision maker waits until all the ability values are presented,
sorts them, and then picks the largest k values. As such, we define the regret of an online selection
algorithm as the expected gap in performance between the online decision and the offline solution,
and we prove that the optimal online algorithm has a regret that is bounded uniformly over pn,kq.
The constant bound depends only on the maximal element of the support and on the minimal
mass value of the ability distribution.
Our proof is constructive: we devise an adaptive policy—the Budget-Ratio (BR) policy—that
achieves bounded regret. The policy is adaptive in the sense that the actions are adjusted based
on the remaining number of candidates to be inspected and on the residual budget. The proof
that the BR policy achieves bounded regret is based on an interesting drift argument for the BR
process that tracks the ratio between the residual budget and the remaining number of candidates
to be inspected. Under our policy, BR sample paths are attracted to and then remain pegged to a
certain value; see in Figure 4 in Section 4. Drift arguments are typical in the study of stability of
queues (see, e.g., Bramson et al. 2008), but the proof here is somewhat subtle: the drift is strong
early in the horizon but it weakens as the remaining number of steps decreases. Since “wrong”
A. Arlotto and I. Gurvich: Uniformly bounded regret in the multi-secretary problem 3
decisions early in the horizon are more detrimental, this diminishing strength does not compromise
the regret. This result shows, in particular, that the budget ratio is a sufficient state descriptor for
the development of near-optimal policies. In other words, while there are pairs of (residual budget,
remaining number of candidates) that share the same ratio, the same BR decisions, but different
optimal actions, these different decisions have little effect on the total expected reward.
We also show that adaptivity is key. While non-adaptive policies could have temporal variation
in actions (and hence could have different actions towards the end of the horizon) this variation
is not enough: the regret of non-adaptive policies is, in general, of the order of
?
n. Specifically,
non-adaptive policies tend to be too greedy and run out of budget too soon. Non-adaptive policies
introduce independence between decisions and, consequently, “too much” variance into the speed
at which the recruiting budget is consumed.
Closely related to our work is the paper Wu et al. (2015) that offers an elegant adaptive index
policy that we re-visit in Section 4.1. Under this policy, the ratio of remaining budget to remaining
number of steps is a martingale. When the initial ratio of budget to horizon, k{n, is safely far from
the jumps of the discrete distribution, this martingale property guarantees a bounded regret. In
general, however, it is precisely the martingale symmetry that increases the regret. In their proof,
Wu et al. (2015) show that their policy achieves, up to a constant, a deterministic-relaxation upper
bound. This upper bound is not generally achievable and we must, instead, use the stochastic offline
sort as a benchmark. The detailed analysis of the offline sort gives rise to sufficient conditions that,
when satisfied by an online policy, guarantee uniformly bounded regret.
Notation. We use Z` to denote the non-negative integers and R` to denote the non-negative
reals. For j P t1,2, . . .u, we use rjs to denote the set of integers t1, . . . , ju and we set rjs “ H
otherwise. Given the real numbers x, y, z, we set pxq` “maxt0, xu, x^y“mintx, yu, and we write
y “ x˘ z to mean that |y ´ x |ď z. Throughout, to simplify notation, we use M ”Mpx, y, zq to
denote a Hardy-style constant dependent on x, y, and z that may change from one line to the next.
2. The multi-secretary problem
A decision maker is sequentially presented with n candidates with abilities X1,X2, . . . ,Xn, and,
given a recruiting budget equal to k, can select up to k candidates to maximize the total expected
ability of those selected up to and including time n. Of course, there is nothing to study if ką n:
the decision maker can take all candidates, so it suffices to consider pairs pn,kq that belong to the
lattice triangle
T “ tpn,kq PZ2` : 0ď kď nu.
The abilities X1,X2, . . . ,Xn are assumed to be independent across candidates and drawn from
a common cumulative distribution function F supported on a finite set A“ tam, am´1, . . . , a1 : 0ă
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am ă am´1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă a1u of distinct real numbers. We denote by pfm, fm´1, . . . , f1q the probability
mass function with fj “ PpX1 “ ajq for all j P rms, and we let F be the cumulative distribution
function (so that fm “ F pamq ă F pam´1q ă . . .ă F pa1q “ 1) and F¯ “ 1´F be the survival function.
Also, for future reference we choose a value am`1 ă am with fm`1 “ 0 so that F pam`1q “ 0 and
F¯ pam`1q “ 1.
The selection process unfolds as follows: suppose that at time t P rns the residual recruiting
budget is κ and that the sum of the abilities of the selected candidates up to and including time
t´ 1 is w. If the candidate inspected (or “interviewed”) at time t has ability Xt “ a, then the
decision maker may select the candidate—increasing the cumulative ability to w`a and reducing
the residual budget to κ´ 1—or to reject the candidate—leaving the accrued ability at w and the
remaining budget at κ.
A policy is feasible if the number of selected candidates does not exceed the recruiting budget
k. It is online if the decision with regards to the tth candidate is based only on its ability, the
abilities of prior candidates, and the history of the (possibly randomized) decisions up to time t.
All decisions are final: if the candidate interviewed at time t is rejected, it is forever lost. Vice
versa, if the tth candidate is selected at time t, then that decision cannot be revoked at a later
time.
Given a sequence U1,U2, . . . ,Un of independent random variables with the uniform distribution
on r0,1s that is also independent of tX1,X2, . . . ,Xnu, we let F0 denote the trivial σ-field and, for
t P rns, we set Ft “ σtX1,U1,X2,U2, . . . ,Xt,Utu be the σ-field generated by the random variables
tX1,U1,X2,U2, . . . ,Xt,Utu. An online policy pi is a sequence of tFt : t P rnsu-adapted binary random
variables σpi1 , σ
pi
2 , . . . , σ
pi
n where σ
pi
t “ 1 means that the candidate with ability Xt is selected. Since
the uniform random variables U1,U2, . . . ,Ut are included in Ft, then the time-t decision, σpit , can
be randomized. A feasible online policy requires that the number of selected candidates does not
exceed the recruiting budget, i.e., that
ř
tPrns σ
pi
t ď k, so
Πpn,kq ”
#
pσpi1 , σpi2 , . . . , σpinq P t0,1un : σpit PFt for all t P rns and
ÿ
tPrns
σpit ď k
+
,
is then the set of all feasible online policies. For pi PΠpn,kq, we let W pi0 ,W pi1 , . . . ,W pin be the sequence
of random variables that track the accumulated ability: we set W pi0 “ 0, and for r P rns we let
W pir “
ÿ
tPrrs
Xtσ
pi
t “W pir´1`Xrσpir .
The expected ability accrued at time n by policy pi is then given by
V pionpn,kq “ErW pin s “E
«ÿ
tPrns
Xtσ
pi
t
ff
.
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For each pn,kq P T , the goal of the decision maker is to maximize the expected value:
V ˚onpn,kq “ max
piPΠpn,kq
V pionpn,kq.
For completeness, we include in Appendix C an analysis of the dynamic program. The analysis of
the Bellman equation confirms an intuitive property of “good” solutions: the optimal action should
only depend on the remaining number of steps and the remaining budget and not on the current
level of accrued ability. It also allows for a comparison of the Budget-Ratio policy we propose in
Section 4 with the optimal policy.
Non-adaptive policies are an interesting subset of feasible online policies. If the residual recruiting
budget at time t is positive, then a non-adaptive policy selects the arriving candidate with ability
Xt “ aj with probability pj,t P r0,1s independently of all the previous actions. The probabilities
pj,t are determined in advance: they can vary from one period to the next, but this variation is
not adapted in response to the previous selection/rejection decisions. A more complete description
of non-adaptive policies appears in Section 5. We let Πna ĎΠpn,kq be the family of non-adaptive
policies and define
V ˚napn,kq “ sup
piPΠna
V pionpn,kq
to be the optimal performance among these.
No feasible online policy—adapted or not—can do better than the offline, full-information, coun-
terpart in which all values are presented in advance. The expected ability accrued at time n by the
offline problem is given by
V ˚offpn,kq “E
«
max
σ1,...,σn
#ÿ
tPrns
Xtσt : pσ1, . . . , σnq P t0,1un and
ÿ
tPrns
σt ď k
+ff
.
Since the offline solution selects the best k candidates for each realization of X1, . . . ,Xn, we have
that
V pionpn,kq ď V ˚offpn,kq, for all pn,kq P T and all pi PΠpn,kq.
We use the value of the offline problem as a benchmark. The optimal online policy trivially achieves
the offline benchmark if k“ 0 or k“ n. The main results of this paper (Theorem 3 and Corollary
1) are gathered in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (The regret of online feasible policies). Let  “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u. Then
there exists a policy br PΠpn,kq and a constant M ”Mpq such that
V ˚offpn,kq´V ˚onpn,kq ď V ˚offpn,kq´V bron pn,kq ď a1M for all pn,kq P T .
Furthermore, if pf1` qnď k ď p1´ fm´ qn, then an optimal non-adaptive policy has regret that
grows like
?
n. Specifically, there is a constant M ”Mp,m,a1, . . . , amq such that
M
?
nď V ˚offpn,kq´V ˚napn,kq.
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Figure 1 Dynamic-programming and Budget-Ratio regrets in Kleinberg’s example
Notes. Kleinberg’s example on A“ t1,2,3u and probability mass function p 1
2
`2,2, 1
2
´4q. On the left, we see that
the regret grows linearly with 1{ (as n “ r1{2s ). On the right, we take “ 0.01 and n“ 10,000 and note that the
regret of both the dynamic-programming and the Budget-Ratio policies is maximized at k“ 4,700, which corresponds
to the threshold T2 “ 12 pF¯ pa2q` F¯ pa3qq “ 0.47 which will be key in our Budget-Ratio policy for this setting.
We conclude this section with a discussion of the dependence of the regret on the minimal mass
2“mintfm, . . . , f1u. The following lemma shows that, in general, the regret of the optimal policy
grows with . The example was provided to us by Kleinberg (2017). The proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 (Regret lower bound in Kleinberg’s example). Consider the three-point distribu-
tion on A “ ta3, a2, a1u with probability mass function p 12 ` 2,2, 12 ´ 4q and let n “ r 12 s and
k “ rn{2s. Then, there exists a constant Γą 0 such that
Γ

ď V ˚offpn, kq´V ˚onpn, kq ď V ˚offpn, kq´V bron pn, kq.
Thus, we also have that
Γ

ď sup
pn,kqPT
tV ˚offpn,kq´V ˚onpn,kqu ď suppn,kqPT
 
V ˚offpn,kq´V bron pn,kq
(
.
Thus, one cannot generally expect a bound that does not depend on the minimal mass. Figure 1
shows that in this case too, the Budget-Ratio policy we develop in this paper performs remarkably
well relative to the optimal. It is just that, as  shrinks, the regret of both grows linearly with 1{.
Remark 1 (On the regret with uniform random permutations). We note here that
there are regret upper bounds for a version of this multi-secretary problem in which the values
are given by a uniform random permutation of the integers rns instead of being from a random
sample. Within the uniform random permutation framework, Kleinberg (2005) proves that the
minimal regret in this setting is of the order of
?
k and provides an algorithm that achieves this
lower bound.
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3. The offline problem
Denoting by Zrj “
ř
tPrrs 1pXt “ ajq the number of candidates with ability aj inspected up to and
including time r, the offline optimization problem has the compact representation
V ˚offpn,kq “E rϕpZn1 , . . . ,Znm, kqs , (1)
where, for pz1, . . . , zmq PZm` and k PZ`,
ϕpz1, . . . , zm, kq “ max
s1,...,sm
ÿ
jPrms
ajsj (2)
s.t. 0ď sj ď zj for all j P rmsÿ
jPrms
sj ď k.
For a given realization of Zn1 , . . . ,Z
n
m, the (trivial) optimal solution is to sort the values and
select the k candidates with the largest abilities. That is, one selects Sn1 “mintZn1 , ku candidates
with ability a1. Then, if there is any recruiting budget left, one selects candidates with ability a2
until either selecting all of them or exhausting the remaining budget of k ´ Zn1 , i.e. one selects
Sn2 “ mintZn2 , pk ´ Zn1 q`u candidates with ability a2. In general, the offline number of selected
aj-candidates is given by
Snj “min
 
Znj , pk´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni q`
(
for each j P rms, (3)
so that
V ˚offpn,kq “
ÿ
jPrms
ajE
“
Snj
‰“ ÿ
jPrms
ajE
«
min
 
Znj , pk´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni q`
(ff
. (4)
The offline solution (3) has the appealing property that—up to deviations that are constant in
expectation—all the action is within two ability levels. That is, depending on the ratio k{n, there
is an index j0 P rms such that the offline sort algorithm rejects almost all of the candidates with
ability strictly below aj0`1 and selects all the candidates with ability strictly above aj0 . The action
index j0 depends on the horizon length n and on the recruiting budget k, and it is given for any
pair pn,kq P T by
j0pn,kq “
$’&’%
1 if k{nă f1` f2{2
j : F¯ pajq` fj{2ď k{nă F¯ paj`2q´ fj`1{2 if f1` f2{2ď k{nă 1´ fm{2
m if 1´ fm{2ď k{n.
(5)
If pn,kq are so that j0pn,kq “ j, then the two values at play are aj and aj`1 and this suggests
partitioning T into the sets
Tj “ tpn,kq P T : j0pn,kq “ ju, j P t1,2, . . . ,mu,
to obtain a helpful decomposition of the offline value (4) .
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Proposition 1 (Offline sort decomposition). Let “ 1
2
mintfm, . . . , f1u and fix j P t1, . . . ,mu.
For all pn,kq P Tj one has the boundsÿ
iPrj´1s
ErZni s´ 14 ď
ÿ
iPrj´1s
ErSni s and
mÿ
i“j`2
ErSni s ď 14 . (6)
Consequently, for all pn,kq P Tj one has the decomposition
V ˚offpn,kq “
ÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZni s` ajE
“
Snj
‰` aj`1E “Snj`1‰˘ a14 . (7)
The following lemma will be used repeatedly in the sequel. All lemmas stated in the paper are
proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Let B be a binomial random variable with n trials and success probability p. Then, for
any εą 0,
ErpB´ kq`s ď 1
4ε
if p` εď k
n
, and Erpk´Bq`s ď 1
4ε
if
k
n
ď p´ ε. (8)
The first use of Lemma 2 is in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. If j “ 1, the left inequality of (6) reduces to ´p4q´1 ď 0, and there is
nothing to prove. For 1ă j and ιă j, we obtain from (3) that
0ďZnι ´Snι “
´
min
!
Znι ,
ÿ
iPrιs
Zni ´ k
)¯
`
ď
´ ÿ
iPrιs
Zni ´ k
¯
`
ď
´ ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni ´ k
¯
`
,
By the definition of Tj and (5), we have that F¯ pajq` ď k{n, so, since the sum B “řiPrj´1sZni is
binomial with parameters n and F¯ pajq “ fj´1` . . .` f1, the first inequality in (6) follows from (8).
For the second inequality in (6), notice that if j P tm´ 1,mu then there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise, if j ďm´ 2 we have for all ιě j` 2 (or, equivalently for ι´ 1ě j` 1) that
Snι “min
#
Znι ,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrι´1s
Zni
¯
`
+
ď
´
k´
ÿ
iPrι´1s
Zni
¯
`
ď
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj`1s
Zni
¯
`
.
The sum B “řiPrj`1sZni is a binomial random variable with success probability F¯ paj`2q “ fj`1`
fj` . . .`f1, so that since “ 12 mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u and pn,kq P Tj we have that k{nď F¯ paj`2q´,
and the second inequality in (6) again follows from (8).
To conclude the proof of the proposition, we recall (4) and rewrite V ˚offpn,kq as
V ˚offpn,kq “´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
aitErZni s´E rSni su`
ÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZni s` ajE
“
Snj
‰` aj`1E “Snj`1‰` mÿ
i“j`2
ai rSni s . (9)
The definition of Sni in (3), the monotonicity am ă am´1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă a1, and the left inequality of (6)
then give us that
0ď
ÿ
iPrj´1s
aitErZni s´E rSni su ď a1
˜ ÿ
iPrj´1s
ErZni s´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
E rSni s
¸
ď a1
4
. (10)
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Similarly, the monotonicity am ă am´1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă a1 and the right inequality of (6) then imply that
0ď
mÿ
i“j`2
ai rSni s ď a14 , (11)
so the decomposition (7) follows after one estimates the first and the last sum of (9) with the
bounds in (10) and (11) respectively. ˝
For any feasible online policy pi P Πpn,kq, we let Spi,rj “
řr
t“1 σ
pi
t 1pXt “ ajq be the number of
candidates with ability level aj that are selected by policy pi up to and including time r, so the
expected total ability accrued by policy pi can be written as
V pionpn,kq “E
«ÿ
tPrns
Xtσ
pi
t
ff
“
ÿ
jPrms
ajErSpi,nj s.
Proposition 1 suggests that, to have bounded regret, an online algorithm must be selecting almost
all candidates with abilities a1, a2, . . . , aj0´1 and rejecting almost all of the candidates with abilities
aj0`2, . . . , am if j0 is such that k{n P rF¯ paj0q ` 12fj0 , F¯ paj0`2q ´ 12fj0`1q. This sufficient condition
guides us in the development of the Budget-Ratio policy in Section 4.
Proposition 2 (A sufficient condition). Let “ 1
2
mintfm, . . . , f1u. For any given pn,kq P T let
j0 ” j0pn,kq be the index defined by (5) and suppose there is a feasible online policy pi ” pipn,kq P
Πpn,kq, a stopping time τ ” τppiq ď n, and a constant M ”Mpq ă8 such that
(i)
ř
jPrj0´1sErSpi,τj s “
ř
jPrj0´1sErZτj s,
(ii) ErSpi,τj0 s ěErSτj0s´M ,
(iii) ErSpi,τj0`1s ěErSτj0`1s´M ,
(iv) Erτ s ě n´M .
Then, one has that
sup
pn,kqPT
tV ˚offpn,kq´V pionpn,kqu ď 3a1M ` a14 .
The regret bound in Proposition 2 has two components (summands). The first one accounts
for three inefficiencies of the online policy pi with respect to the offline solution. There is the cost
for running out of budget too early—at most M periods too early in expectation according to
condition (iv)—which cannot exceed a1M , and there are the costs that come from conditions (ii)
and (iii) that can each contribute to a maximal expected loss of a1M . Finally, the second summand
accounts for the values that the offline solution might be choosing and that are strictly smaller
than aj0`1. However, Proposition 1 tells us that their cumulative expected value is at most a1{p4q.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since T “ŤjPrms Tj, we have that
sup
pn,kqPT
tV ˚offpn,kq´V pionpn,kqu “max
jPrms
#
sup
pn,kqPTj
tV ˚offpn,kq´V pionpn,kqu
+
,
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and it suffices to verify that, for any j P rms,
sup
pn,kqPTj
tV ˚offpn,kq´V pionpn,kqu ď 3a1M ` a14 .
For any pn,kq P Tj the definition (5) of the map pn,kq ÞÑ j0pn,kq gives us that j0pn,kq “ j, so for
any policy pi PΠpn,kq and any stopping time τ ď n we have the lower boundÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErSpi,τi s` ajErSpi,τj s` aj`1ErSpi,τj`1s ď
ÿ
jPrms
ajErSpi,nj s “ V pionpn,kq.
In turn, for the policy pi ” pipn,kq and the stopping time τ ” τppiq given in the proposition, it
follows from the requirements (i), (ii), and (iii) that there is a constant M ”Mpq such thatÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZτi s` ajtErSτj s´Mu` aj`1tErSτj`1s´Mu ď V pionpn,kq,
which, since am ă am´1 ă . . .ă a1, givesÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZτi s` ajErSτj s` aj`1ErSτj s´ 2a1M ď V pionpn,kq. (12)
For τ ď n we now rewrite the upper bound in (7) as
V ˚offpn,kq ď
ÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZτi s` ajE
“
Sτj
‰` aj`1E “Sτj`1‰` a14 (13)
`
ÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZni ´Zτi s` ajE
“
Snj ´Sτj
‰` aj`1E “Snj`1´Sτj`1‰ ,
and we obtain from the definition (3) of the offline number of selected ai-candidates that the
difference 0 ď Sni ´ Sτi ď Zni ´ Zτi “
řn
t“τ`1 1pXt “ aiq for all i P rms. Thus, if we recall that
am ă am´1 ă . . .ă a1, we obtain the boundÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZni ´Zτi s`ajE
“
Snj ´Sτj
‰`aj`1E “Snj`1´Sτj`1‰ď a1E
« ÿ
iPrms
nÿ
t“τ`1
1pXt “ aiq
ff
“ a1Ern´τ s,
so when we use Property (iv) to estimate this last right-hand side and replace this estimate in (13)
we finally have that
V ˚offpn,kq ď
ÿ
iPrj´1s
aiErZτi s` ajE
“
Sτj
‰` aj`1E “Sτj`1‰` a1M ` a14 . (14)
The proof of the proposition then follows by combining the bounds (12) and (14). ˝
Remark 2 (A deterministic relaxation.). A further upper bound to the multi-secretary
problem is provided by an intuitive deterministic relaxation. Given the linear program (2), we
consider its optimal value
DRpn,kq “ϕpErZn1 s, . . . ,ErZnms, kq (15)
A. Arlotto and I. Gurvich: Uniformly bounded regret in the multi-secretary problem 11
and we note that its optimal solution is given by
s˚j “min
 
ErZnj s, pk´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
ErZni sq`
(“min nfj, pk´nF¯ pajqq`( for all j P rms. (16)
Since the expected number of aj-candidates selected by the offline solution psj “ ErSnj s “
ErmintZnj , pk´
ř
iPrj´1sZ
n
i q`us is a feasible solution for the deterministic relaxation (15), we imme-
diately have the bound
V ˚offpn,kq ďDRpn,kq for all pairs pn,kq P T .
As central-limit-theorem intuition suggests, the “cost of randomness” is at most of the order of
?
n.
But it does not have to be that large: there is a subset T 1 Ă T for which the difference DRpn,kq´
V ˚offpn,kq is bounded by a constant that does not depend on pn,kq P T 1. Members pn,kq of T 1 are such
that k{n is “safely” away from the jump points of the distribution F (Appendix D). For pn,kq P T 1,
benchmarking against the deterministic relaxation is the same as benchmarking against the offline
sort (see also Wu et al. 2015). In general this is not the case. For instance, if one takes k“ErZn1 s “
nf1 then DRpn,kq “ a1nf1 but there exists M ă8 such that a1ErSn1 s “ a1ErmintZn1 , kus “ a1nf1`
ErmintZn1 ´ nf1,0us ď a1nf1 ´M
?
n “ DRpn,kq ´M?n. The first inequality follows from the
approximation of the centered binomial Zn1 ´nf1 by a normal with standard deviation
a
nf1p1´ f1q
as in Lemma 5 below.
4. The Budget-Ratio (BR) policy
We now introduce an adaptive online policy that makes selection decisions depending on the ratio
between the remaining number of positions to be filled (the remaining budget) and the remaining
number of candidates to be inspected (the remaining time), and we refer to this policy as the
Budget-Ratio (BR) policy.
With pi “ br, the random variables σbr1 , σbr2 , . . . , σbrn give us the sequence of selection decisions
under the BR policy (see Section 2), and we let, for t P rns,
Kt “ k´
ÿ
sPrts
σbrs “Kt´1´σbrt
be the remaining budget after the tth decision (K0 “ k). We now introduce the thresholds 0“ T1 ă
T2 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă Tm ă Tm`1 “`8 given by
Tj “ 1
2
pF¯ pajq` F¯ paj`1qq for each j P t2,3, . . . ,mu,
so that the Budget-Ratio decision at time t` 1 selects Xt`1 depending on its value and on the
position of the ratio Kt{pn ´ tq relative to these thresholds. Specifically, at each decision time
t` 1 P t1, . . . n´ 1u, the BR policy
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Figure 2 The BR policy: thresholds and dynamics.
δ
δ
2δ
Kt
n´t
t0 1 ¨ ¨ ¨ τ0 n
Select any
Xt`1 ě a5 1
[)T5
Select any
Xt`1 ě a4 F¯ pa5q
[)T4
Select any
Xt`1 ě a3
F¯ pa4q
[)T3
Select any
Xt`1 ě a2 F¯ pa3q
[)T2
Select any
Xt`1 ě a1
F¯ pa2q
[F¯ pa1q“T1“0
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨
. . . . . . . . . τ
Notes. The y-axis has the thresholds of the BR policy for the 5-point distribution on A“ ta5, a4, a3, a2, a1u with the
probability mass function pf5, f4, f3, f2, f1q “ p 528 , 528 , 728 , 628 , 528 q. The plotted series is a sample path realization of the
ratio t Kt
n´t : 0ď tď nu which enters the “orbit” of the threshold T3 at time τ0 (so jpτ0q “ 3) and exits at time τ . Up
until τ0 both thresholds T3 and T4 are in play. In this chart we take δ“ 19224 ă “ 556 “ 12 mintf5, . . . , f1u. Notice that
F¯ pa3q “ f1 ` f2. When F¯ pa3q ăKt{pn´ tq ă T3, the budget is, in expectation, sufficient to take some a3 values but
the policy will not do that until T3 is crossed. This “under-selection” makes Kt{pn´ tq drift up toward T3. When
T3 ăKt{pn´ tq ă F¯ pa4q, the budget is, in expectation, insufficient to take all a3 values but the policy does select
them. This “over-selection” makes Kt{pn´ tq drift towards T3.
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(i) identifies the index j P rms such that
Tj ď Kt
n´ t ă Tj`1;
(ii) selects Xt`1 if and only if Kt ą 0 and Xt`1 ě aj; i.e., it sets
σbrt`1 “
#
1 if Kt ą 0 and Xt`1 ą aj`1
0 otherwise.
Thus, the value Xt`1 is selected with probability Ppσbrt`1 “ 1|Ftq “ F¯ paj`1q1pKt ą 0q.
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the selection regions of the BR policy. It encapsulates
the source of its good performance. Consider an initial budget ratio k{n P rT3, F¯ pa4qq as in the
figure. In this range there is enough budget, in expectation, to select all of the candidates with
ability values a1 and a2. The remaining budget after such selections should be used for candidates
with ability equal to a3 or smaller. While the budget ratio is in the colored band, the policy will
select all of the a1 and a2 values. It will also select a3-candidates whenever the budget ration is
above T3. If we can guarantee that the budget ratio stays in the colored band almost until the
end of the horizon, then the BR policy will select as many a3 values as possible without giving
up on any a1 or a2 values. This logic is formalized in the proof of Corollary 1. The policy has two
natural properties: (i) since T1 “ 0, the BR policy selects all a1-valued candidates until exhausting
the budget; and (ii) since Tm´1 ă 1 and Tm “`8, the BR policy selects all remaining values as
soon as the remaining budget is greater than or equal to the remaining number of time periods
(i.e., if n´ tďKt).
Next, we set
“ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u,
fix 0ă δă , and consider the stopping time
τ0 “ inf
"
tě 0 :
ˇˇˇˇ
Kt
n´ t ´Tj
ˇˇˇˇ
ď δ
2
for some j P rms or tě n´ 2δ´1´ 1
*
.
If τ0 ă n´ 2δ´1´ 1, then τ0 is the first time that the ratio Kt{pn´ tq enters the “orbit” of one of
the thresholds; see Figure 2. We denote by jpτ0q the index of the threshold that is within δ{2 of
the ratio Kτ0{pn´ τ0q, and we use Tjpτ0q to denote the value of that threshold. If τ0 “ n´ 2δ´1´ 1,
then we set jpτ0q “m` 1 and Tjpτ0q “8. For all tď n´ 2δ´1 ´ 1 the jumps of Kt{pn´ tq satisfy
the absolute bound ˇˇˇˇ
Kt
n´ t ´
Kt`1
n´pt` 1q
ˇˇˇˇ
ď δ
2
,
so that, on the event τ0 ă n´ 2δ´1´ 1, we are guaranteed that Tjpτ0q is either Tj or Tj`1 when j is
such that k{n P rTj, Tj`1q.
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Figure 3 Simulated ratio and remaining budget averages
Notes. Simulated averages—with n “ 1,000 and based on 10,000 trials—of the ratio 1
n´t
´
k´řsPrts σpis ¯ and of
the remaining budget k´řsPrts σpis when pi is the optimal dynamic-programming (DP) policy or the Budget-Ratio
(BR) policy. The ability distribution is uniform on A“ t0.20,0.65,1.10,1.55,2.00u. In the plots, we vary the budget
k P t260,300,340u starting with the smallest at the top and while keeping the ratio k{n within the orbit of T2 “ 0.30.
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After time τ0, we consider the process
Yu “Kτ0`u´Tjpτ0qpn´ τ0´uq for u P t0,1, . . . n´ τ0u,
which serves a useful vehicle to study the behavior of the budget-ratio process and, in particular,
to track the deviations of the budget ratio from the threshold Tjpτ0q. This is becauseˇˇˇˇ
Kτ0`u
n´ τ0´u ´Tjpτ0q
ˇˇˇˇ
ą δ if and only if |Yu| ą δpn´ τ0´uq.
In words, the ratio is outside of the dark region in Figure 2 if and only if the deviation process Yu
exceeds the “moving target” δpn´ τ0´uq.
The process tYu : 0ď uď n´ τ0u is adapted to the increasing sequence of σ-fields t pFu ”Fτ0`u :
0 ď u ď n ´ τ0u. Importantly, the process tYu : 0 ď u ď n ´ τ0u has the mean-reversal property
that we alluded to in the description of Figure 2: if Kτ0`u ą 0 and Yu ě 0, then we have that
Tjpτ0q ďKτ0`u{pn´ τ0 ´ uq, and the BR policy selects all values strictly larger than ajpτ0q`1, i.e.,
σbrτ0`u`1 ě 1pXτ0`u`1 ą ajpτ0q`1q so that
Erσbrτ0`u`1| pFus1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ě 0q ě F¯ pajpτ0q`1q1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ě 0q,
and we have the negative-drift property
ErYu`1´Yu| pFus1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ě 0q “ t´Erσbrτ0`u`1| pFus`Tjpτ0qu1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ě 0q (17)
ď ´1
2
fjpτ0q1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ě 0q.
In the case that Yu ă 0 and Kτ0`u ą 0, we have that Kτ0`u{pn´ τ0 ´ uq ă Tjpτ0q, so that the BR
policy skips all values smaller or equal to ajpτ0q, i.e., σ
br
τ0`u`1 ď 1pXτ0`u`1 ą ajpτ0qq so that
Erσbrτ0`u`1| pFus1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ă 0q ď F¯ pajpτ0qq1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ă 0q,
and we have a strictly positive drift
ErYu`1´Yu| pFus1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ă 0q “ t´Erσbrτ0`u`1| pFus`Tjpτ0qu1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ă 0q (18)
ě 1
2
fjpτ0q1pKτ0`u ą 0, Yu ă 0q.
For completeness, we also note that if Kτ0`u “ 0, then the drift is simply given by
ErYu`1´Yu| pFus1pKτ0`u “ 0q “ Tjpτ0q1pKτ0`u “ 0q. (19)
The bounds (17) and (18) show that, regardless of whether the ratio Kτ0`u{pn´ τ0´uq is above
or below the critical threshold, the BR policy pulls it towards the threshold. This preliminary drift
analysis will be useful in showing that the stopping time
τ “ inf
"
tą τ0 :
ˇˇˇˇ
Kt
n´ t ´Tjpτ0q
ˇˇˇˇ
ą δ or tě n´ 2δ´1´ 1
*
, (20)
at which the ratio exits the critical orbit (see again the right side of Figure 2) is suitably large.
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Figure 4 Ratio sample paths
Notes. Sample paths of the ratio Rpit “ 1n´t
´
k´řsPrts σpis ¯ when pi is the optimal dynamic-programming (DP) policy
or the Budget-Ratio (BR) policy. The ability distribution is uniform on A “ t0.20,0.65,1.10,1.55,2.00u. The two
plots have common random numbers but different initial conditions. On the left we take k“ 300 and on the right we
have k“ 340. In both instances, the initial ratio k{n is within the orbit of T2 “ 0.30. When k{n“ 0.30“ T2 (left) the
budget ratio Rbrt stays within the orbit of T2 for most time periods. When k{n“ 0.34ą T2 (right) the budget ratio
is first pulled towards the threshold T2 and then it stays within its orbit until its escape time towards the end of the
horizon. Despite just being on a sample path, the ratios Rt˚ and R
br
t are remarkably close two each other.
Theorem 2 (BR stopping time). Let  “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u. Then there is a constant
M ”Mpq such that for all pn,kq P T , the stopping time τ in (20) satisfies the bound Erτ s ě n´M .
The proof of Theorem 2 (at the end of this section) is based on the mean-reversal property
established above and a Lyapunov function argument. One must be careful in this analysis: when
approaching the horizon’s end, a small change in Kt can lead to a large change in Kt{pn ´ tq.
Viewed in terms of the deviation process Yu, the challenge is that the target δpn´τ0´uq is moving
and easier to exceed when u is large. Figure 4 is a simulation that illustrates how this “attraction”
to a threshold is manifested at the sample path level.
Theorem 2 shows that the BR policy satisfies the sufficient condition (iv) in Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 then proceeds to show that the remaining requirements (i)–(iii) in Proposition 2 are
also satisfied.
Corollary 1 (Uniformly bounded regret). Let  “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u. Then the BR
policy and the stopping time τ in (20) satisfy the properties in Proposition 2. In particular, there
is a constant M ”Mpq such that
V ˚offpn,kq´V ˚onpn,kq ď 2a1M for all pn,kq P T .
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Figure 5 Dynamic-programming and Budget-Ratio regrets
Notes. The figure displays the dynamic-programming (DP) and budget-ratio (BR) regrets for the 5-point distribution
on A“ t0.2,0.5,0.7,0.8,1.0u with probability mass function pf5, f4, f3, f2, f1q “ p 528 , 528 , 728 , 628 , 528 q. We fix n to either
n“ 1,000 (left) or n“ 10,000 (right) and vary the initial budgets k. The regret is small and piecewise constant. The
“jumps” in the regret function match the jump points of the distribution.
The BR policy, while achieving bounded regret, is not the optimal policy. Considering the opti-
mality equation (47) developed in Appendix C, one can see that with two periods to go (` “ 2
there) and one unit of budget (k “ 1) the optimal action is to take any (and only) values aj ě
h2p1q “ g1p1q ´ g1p0q “ ErX1s. In this state, the BR policy will instead take all values above the
median. Of course while the BR policy makes some mistakes when approaching the horizon’s end,
Corollary 1 is evidence that it mostly does the right thing. Figures 5-6 are numerical evidence for
the performance of the BR policy.
Proof of Corollary 1. It suffices to prove that the BR policy satisfies the sufficient conditions
stated in Proposition 2. By Theorem 2 the BR policy has the associated stopping time τ in (20)
that satisfies condition (iv) in the proposition. Conditions (i)–(iii) are verified by the following
sample-path argument.
If n ă 2δ´1 ` 1, then the three conditions are satisfied immediately by choosing M to be a
suitable constant. Otherwise if n ě 2δ´1 ` 1, we note that Tj “ F¯ pajq ` 12fj “ F¯ paj`1q ´ 12fj for
all j P t2, . . . ,mu, so the definition (5) tells us that if k{n P rTj, Tj`1q then j0pn,kq “ j for all
j P rms. Thus, if j is the index such that k{n P rTj, Tj`1q, then j is the “action” index identified
in Proposition 2, and we verify the three conditions by distinguishing the case tτ0 ă n´ 2δ´1´ 1u
from tτ0 “ n´ 2δ´1´ 1u.
As argued earlier, on the event tτ0 ă n´ 2δ´1 ´ 1u the index jpτ0q P tj, j ` 1u. In turn, for all
tă τ0, the BR policy selects Xt`1 ě aj and skips all Xt`1 ď aj`1. If jpτ0q “ j then for time indices
t P rτ0, τq all values aj´1 and greater are selected and all values aj`1 or smaller are skipped. If
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Figure 6 Dynamic-programming and Budget-Ratio regrets for uniform distributions
Notes. The figure displays the dynamic-programming (DP) and budget-ratio (BR) regrets for uniform distributions
over r0.2,0.2`∆,0.2` 2∆, . . . ,2.0´∆,2.0s where ∆“ p2.0´ 0.2q2{p1´ 2q for 2 P t0.05,0.10,0.20u. As  shrinks
the cardinality of the support grows. We fix n“ 1,000 (left) and n“ 10,000 (right) and vary the recruiting budget k.
As n grows, the regret approaches a piecewise constant function. The optimality gap of the BR policy is, regardless,
very small.
jpτ0q “ j` 1, then on t P rτ0, τq all values aj and greater are selected and all those smaller or equal
than aj`2 are skipped. Thus, on the event tτ0 ă n´ 2δ´1´ 1u we haveÿ
iPrj´1s
Sbr,τi “
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zτi , (21)
where, recall, Sbr,τi is the number of ai candidates selected by time τ . Furthermore,
(i) If jpτ0q “ j, then
Sbr,τj “mintZτj , k´Kτ ´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zτi u“mintZτj , pk´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zτi q`´Kτu and Sbr,τj`1“0. (22)
Here, the left equality holds because out of the total budget used by time τ , which is given
by k´Kτ “řtPrτs σbrt , the quantity řiPrj´1sZτi is allocated to values larger or equal to aj´1
and the remaining to aj.
(ii) If jpτ0q “ j` 1, then we have that
Sbr,τj “Zτj and Sbr,τj`1“mintZτj`1, k´Kτ ´
ÿ
iPrjs
Zτi u“mintZτj`1, pk´
ÿ
iPrjs
Zτi q`´Kτu, (23)
where the right equality holds for reasons that are similar to those given just below (22).
By combining the observations in (22) and (23), we find on the event tτ0 ă n´ 2δ´1´ 1u that
Sbr,τj ěmintpk´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zτi q`,Zτj u´Kτ “Sτj ´Kτ , (24)
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and
Sbr,τj`1 ěmintpk´
ÿ
iPrjs
Zτi q`,Zτj`1u´Kτ “Sτj`1´Kτ , (25)
where we use the fact that if x, y, z are non-negative numbers then minpx´ y, zq ěminpx, zq´ y.
On the event tτ0 “ n´ 2δ´1´ 1u we have that τ “ τ0 and all values greater than or equal to aj
are selected and all values lower than or equal to aj`1 are skipped so thatÿ
iPrj´1s
Sbr,τi “
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zτi and S
br,τ
j “Sτj , (26)
and
0“ Sbr,τj`1 “ pk´
ÿ
iPrjs
Zτi q`´Kτ ěmintZτj`1, pk´
ÿ
iPrjs
Zτi q`u´Kτ “Sτj`1´Kτ . (27)
Finally, since the BR policy selects all remaining values as soon as there is a t P rns such that
Kt ě n´ t, we have that Kτ ď n´ τ and, consequently, that
´ErKτ s ěErτ s´ně´M (28)
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2.
If we now recall the estimates (21), (24) and (25) which hold on the event tτ0 ă n´2δ´1´1u and
the relations (26) and (27) which are satisfied on tτ0 “ n´ 2δ´1´ 1u, take expectations and recall
the bound (28), we see that the sufficient conditions (i)–(iii) in Proposition 2 are all satisfied. ˝
4.1. An alternative to Budget-Ratio: the Adaptive-Index policy.
In closely related work, Wu et al. (2015) offer an elegant adaptive-index policy that we revisit here.
Given the deterministic relaxation (15), we re-solve in each time period the deterministic problem
DRpn´ t,Ktq “ϕpErZn´t1 s, . . . ,ErZn´tm s,Ktq,
and recall from (16) that the optimal solution is given by sj˚,t “ mintErZn´tj s, pKt ´ř
iPrj´1sErZn´ti sq`u “mintfjpn´ tq, pKt´ F¯ pajqpn´ tqq`u for all j P rms.
Then, we construct the adaptive (re-optimized) index policy by mimicking the solution of this
optimization problem. Specifically, if sj˚,t “ fjpn´ tq and the candidate inspected at time t` 1 has
ability aj then that candidate is selected. Otherwise, if sj˚,t “Kt´ F¯ pajqpn´ tq ą 0 then an arriving
aj candidate is selected with probability
pj1,t`1 “ Kt{pn´ tq´ F¯ paj1q
fj1
.
Finally, if sj˚,t “ 0 then an arriving aj candidate is rejected.
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Figure 7 Dynamic-programming (DP), budget-ratio (BR), and adaptive-index (AI) regrets
Notes. The graph displays the regret of different policies when the ability distribution is uniform on A “
t0.2,0.4,0.6, . . . ,1,1.2,1.4, . . . ,2.0u as a function of the horizon length n. In the chart we vary n from 0 to 200,000
and keep the initial budget at k
n
“ F¯ p0.6q (a mass point of the distribution). Whereas the optimal and Budget-Ratio
policies achieve bounded regret, the regret of the Adaptive-Index policy grows with the problem size n.
This policy induces a nice martingale structure. Using the notation introduced in Section 2, we let
σai1 , σ
ai
2 , . . . , σ
ai
n be the sequence of decisions of the Adaptive-Index policy and let K
ai
t “ k´
ř
sPrts σ
ai
s
be the associated remaining-budget process for all t P rns and with Kai0 “ k. In the statement and
in the proof of the next proposition, we use the standard notation a^ b“minta, bu.
Proposition 3. Let τ1 “ inftt P rns :Kait {pn´ tq ą 1u, then the stopped Adaptive-Index ratio pro-
cess tRait^τ1 “
Kait^τ1
n´pt^τ1q : t P rnsu is a martingale.
Proof. Since 0ďRait^τ1 ď 1 it is trivially true that Er|Rait^τ1 |s ă 8 for all t P rns. Next, if Ft is
the σ-field generated by the random variables σai1 , . . . , σ
ai
t , then we have that
ErRaipt`1q^τ1 ´Rait^τ1 |Fts “ErpRaipt`1q^τ1 ´Rait^τ1q1pτ1 ą tq|Fts “ 1pτ1 ą tqE
„
Kait ´σait`1
n´pt` 1q ´
Kait
n´ t
ˇˇˇ
Ft

,
where σait`1 “ 1 with probability K
ai
t
n´t ^ 1 and it is zero otherwise. Hence,
ErRaipt`1q^τ1 ´Rait^τ1 |Fts “
¨˝
Kait ´ K
ai
t
n´t ^ 1
n´pt` 1q ´
Kait
n´ t‚˛1pτ1 ą tq “ 0,
where we use the fact that 1pτ1 ą tq implies Kait {pn´ tq ď 1. ˝
Because of this martingale structure, the Adaptive-Index ratio Kait {pn´ tq remains “close” to
k{n so that this policy, like the BR policy, is careful in utilizing its budget and does not run out
of it until (almost) the horizon’s end. Furthermore, this martingale property guarantees bounded
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regret when the initial ratio k{n is safely far from the masses of the discrete distribution (see also
Wu et al. 2015, and Section D in this paper).
In general, however, spending the budget at the right “rate” is not sufficient, however. It is
also important that the budget is spent on the right candidates and the symmetric martingale
structure is too weak for that purpose: when initialized, for example, at k{n“ F¯ pajq for some j,
the martingale spends an equal amount of time below and above F¯ pajq, and the re-optimized index
policy takes the values aj and aj`1 in equal proportions. A good policy should start selecting aj`1
values only after it has selected all (or most) aj values first. Figure 7 gives an illustration of this
phenomenon.
4.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Given the deviation process
Yu “Kτ0`u´Tjpτ0qpn´ τ0´uq, u P t0,1, . . . n´ τ0u,
the key step in the proof of Theorem 2 is the derivation of an exponential tail bound for the random
variable |Yu | for each u P t0,1, . . . , n´ τ0u. As before, we take “ 12 mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u.
Proposition 4 (Exponential tail bound). Fix 0ă δă , c“ e2´3 and 0ă ηă p´δq{c. Then
there is a constant M ”Mpq such that, for all 0ď uď n´ τ0, we have the exponential tail bound
Pp|Yu |ě δpn´ τ0´uq | pF0q ď 2expt´ηδ2 pn´ τ0qu`M expt´ηδpn´ τ0´uqu.
Proof. If τ0 “ n´ 2δ´1 ´ 1, then the statement is trivial. Otherwise, for τ0 ă n´ 2δ´1 ´ 1 the
proof is an application—using the mean-reversal property of the BR policy—of the tail bound of
Hajek (1982) to the two processes tYu : 0ď uď n´ τ0u and t´Yu : 0ď uď n´ τ0u.
We begin with the former. For any aě 0 we have that 1pYu ą aq “ 1pYu ą a,Kτ0`u ą 0q for all
0ď uď n´ τ0, so that, by replacing fjpτ0q with “ 12 mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u in (17), we obtain the
condition
ErYu`1´Yu| pFus1pYu ą aq ď´1pYu ą aq for all aě 0 and 0ď uď n´ τ0. (C1)
Since, by definition,
|Yu`1´Yu |“ |´σbrτ0`u`1´Tjpτ0q |ď 2 for all 0ď uă n´ τ0,
we also have the condition
Erexptλ|Yu`1´Yu |u| pFus ď e2λ for all λą 0. (C2)
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Conditions (C1) and (C2) (with λ“ 1q imply, by Hajek (1982, Lemma 2.1) that for η, ρ satisfying
0ă ηă p´ δq{c and ρ“ 1´ ηp´ ηcq, (29)
we have
ErexptηpYu`1´Yuqu| pFus1pYu ą aq ď ρ and ErexptηpYu`1´ aqu| pFus1pYu ď aq ď e2,
for all aě 0 and all 0ď uă n´ τ0. Hajek (1982, Theorem 2.3, Equation 2.8) then gives
PpYu ě δpn´ τ0´uq| pF0q ď ρu exptηY0´ ηδpn´ τ0´uqu` e21´ρ exptηa´ ηδpn´ τ0´uqu,
for all a ě 0 and 0 ď u ď n ´ τ0. Taking a “ 0 and using the fact that and Y0 ď |Y0 | “ |Kτ0 ´
Tjpτ0qpn´ τ0q |ď δ2pn´ τ0q as well as the standard inequality ρ“ 1´ ηp´ ηcq ď expt´ηp´ ηcqu,
we finally have the upper bound
PpYu ě δpn´ τ0´uq| pF0q ď expt´ηδ2 pn´ τ0q´ ηup´ ηc´ δqu` e21´ρ expt´ηδpn´ τ0´uqu.
The choice of η in (29) tells us that ´ ηc´ δ ą 0, so we can drop the second term in the first
exponent on the right-hand side. By setting M ”Mpq “ e2
1´ρ , we then have
PpYu ě δpn´ τ0´uq| pF0q ď expt´ηδ2 pn´ τ0qu`M expt´ηδpn´ τ0´uqu. (30)
The analysis of the sequence t´Yu : 0ď uď n´ τ0u follows a similar logic. For any aě 0
Er´Yu`1`Yu| pFus1p´Yu ą aq “´ErYu`1´Yu| pFus1pYu ă´a,Kτ0`u ą 0q
´ErYu`1´Yu| pFus1pYu ă´a,Kτ0`u “ 0q,
so that by (18) and (19) we have
Er´Yu`1`Yu| pFus1p´Yu ą aq ď´ 12fjpτ0q1pYu ă´a,Kτ0`u ą 0q´Tjpτ0q1pYu ă´a,Kτ0`u “ 0q,
for all a ě 0. On the event tYu ă ´a,Kτ0`u “ 0u, we must have that jpτ0q ą 1. Otherwise, if
jpτ0q “ 1, Tjpτ0q “ 0 and Yu “Kτ`u “ 0ě´a by definition. In particular, Tjpτ0q ě  on this event,
and it follows that
Er´Yu`1`Yu| pFus1p´Yu ą aq ď´1p´Yu ą aq. (ĂC1)
for all aě 0. It is then easily verified that
Erexptλ|Yu`1´Yu |u| pFus ď e2λ for all λą 0. (ĂC2)
As before, Hajek (1982, Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.3) gives—with c “ e2 ´ 3, 0 ă η ď p´ δq{c,
ρ“ 1´ ηp´ ηcq, and M ”Mpq “ e2
1´ρ—that
Pp´Yu ě δpn´ τ0´uq| pF0q ď expt´ηδ2 pn´ τ0qu`M expt´ηδpn´ τ0´uqu. (31)
The statement of the lemma is now the combination of (30) and (31) with M ”Mpq “ 2e2
1´ρ . ˝
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The exponential tail bound in Proposition 4 goes a long way for the proof of Theorem 2 which
follows next.
Proof of Theorem 2. By definition, for τ0 ă tď n´ 2δ´1´ 1, we have that
τ ď t if and only if
ˇˇˇˇ
Kτ0`u
n´ τ0´u ´Tjpτ0q
ˇˇˇˇ
ą δ, for some 0ď uď t´ τ0,
or, represented in terms of Yu,
τ ď t if and only if
ÿ
uPrt´τ0s
1p|Yu |ą δpn´ τ0´uqq ě 1.
We will represent Erτ s as a sum of the tail probabilities
Ppτ ď t| pF0q “ P` ÿ
uPrt´τ0s
1p|Yu |ą δpn´ τ0´uqq ě 1| pF0˘, for τ0 ă tď n´ 2δ´1´ 1,
which, by Markov’s inequality, satisfy the bounds
Ppτ ď t| pF0q ď ÿ
uPrt´τ0s
Pp|Yu |ą δpn´ τ0´uq| pF0q, for τ0 ă tď n´ 2δ´1´ 1.
By integrating the exponential tail bound in Proposition 4 for 0ď uď t´ τ0 (recall that τ0 ă tď
n´ 2δ´1´ 1ă n), we obtain
Ppτ ď t| pF0q ď 2pn´ τ0q expt´ηδ2 pn´ τ0qu`M expt´ηδpn´ tqu, (32)
for some constant M ”Mpq. Since τ ą τ0 by definition, then Ppτ ą t| pF0q “ 1 for all tď τ0 and we
also have that
Erτ | pF0s ě τ0ÿ
t“0
Ppτ ą t| pF0q` n´2{δ´1ÿ
t“τ0`1
Ppτ ą t| pF0q ě n´ 2δ´1´ 1´ n´2{δ´1ÿ
t“τ0`1
Ppτ ď t| pF0q.
Integrating (32) then gives us another constant M ”Mpq such that
Erτ | pF0s ě n´ 2pn´ τ0q2 expt´ηδ2 pn´ τ0qu´M.
The middle summand on the right-hand side is uniformly bounded, so in summary we have that
Erτ | pF0s ě n´M,
for some constant M ”Mpq ă 8, and the proof of the theorem follows after one takes total
expectations. ˝
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5. The square-root regret of non-adaptive policies
A non-adaptive policy pi is an online feasible policy that is characterized by a probability matrix
tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu. The entry pj,t represents the probability of selecting the candidate
inspected at time t given that the candidate’s ability is Xt “ aj and that the recruiting budget
remaining at time t is non zero. Formally, given pi“ tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu, let
Bt “
ÿ
jPrms
1pUt ď pj,t,Xt “ ajq for t P rns,
and note that the sequence B1,B2, . . . ,Bn is a sequence of Ft-measurable, independent Bernoulli
random variables with success probabilities q1, q2, . . . , qn such that
ErBt|Xt “ ajs “ pj,t and qt “ErBts “
ÿ
jPrms
pj,tfj.
The non-adaptive policy pi selects candidates until it runs out of budget or reaches the end of the
horizon, i.e., up to the stopping time ν ” νppiq given by
ν “min rě 1 : ÿ
tPrrs
Bt ě k or rě n
(
.
The expected total ability accrued by the non-adaptive policy pi is then given by
V pionpn,kq “
ÿ
jPrms
ajE
«ÿ
tPrνs
Bt1pXt “ ajq
ff
,
and Vn˚apn,kq “ suppiPΠna V pionpn,kq is the performance of the best non-adaptive policy.
An intuitive non-adaptive policy is the index policy id“ tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu, that takes its
probabilities from the solution (16) to the deterministic relaxation (15). If the residual budget at
time t is non-zero and if and jid P rms is the index such that F¯ pajidq ď k{nă F¯ pajid`1q, then the
index policy selects an arriving aj-candidate with probability
pj,t “ sj˚ErZnj s “
sj˚
nfj
“
$’&’%
1 if j ď jid´ 1,
k{n´F¯ pajid q
fjid
if j “ jid,
0 if j ě jid` 1.
(33)
In the main result of this section we prove that, for a large range of pn,kq pairs, the regret
of non-adaptive policies is generally of the order of
?
n. Viewed in the context of Proposition 2,
non-adaptive policies violate property (iv): they run out of budget too early. The proof relies on
this “greediness.”
To build intuition, consider the problem instance with ability distribution that is uniform on
A“ ta3, a2, a1u and with n“ 2k. For each t P rns, the index policy would select a1-candidates with
probability p1,t “ 1, a2-candidates with probability p2,t “ 1{2, and no a3 candidates. The number
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of selections that the index policy would make by time t is then a Binomial random variables with
t trials and success probability equal to k{n“ 1{2. For t“ tn´?nu this random variable has mean
approximately equal to 1
2
pn ´?nq “ p1 ´ 1?
n
qn
2
and standard deviation approximately equal to
1
4
a
n´?n. In this case, the recruiting budget k“ n{2 is, in the limit, 2 standard deviations from
the mean so that, with non-negligible probability, the policy would have exhausted all its budget by
time n´?n and missed Θp?nq1 opportunities to select a1 values. The index policy, however, did
select many a2 values up to this time t. The Budget-Ratio policy—and the dynamic programming
policy—would exchange those a2 with a1 and attain a regret that does not grow with n.
Theorem 3 (The regret of non-adaptive policies). For  “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u suppose
that pf1` qnď kď p1´ fm´ qn. Then there is a constant M ”Mp,m,a1, . . . , amq such that
M
?
nď V ˚offpn,kq´V ˚napn,kq.
As one might expect, the non-adaptive (time-homogeneous) index policy in (33) already achieves
this order of magnitude and, in this sense, is representative of the performance of general non-
adaptive policies.
Lemma 3 (The regret of the non-adaptive index policy). The non-adaptive index policy
id“ tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu has a ?n regret. That is, for any ε P p0,1q and all pairs pn,kq such
that εď k{n we have
V ˚offpn,kq´V idnapn,kq ďDRpn,kq´V idnapn,kq ď ε´1a1
?
n.
The conditions of Theorem 3 are not necessary but certain budget ranges do have to be excluded.
In the small-budget range with kď pf1´ qn, for example, the regret is in fact constant. The offline
solution mostly takes a1 values. The non-adaptive policy ppi that has p1,t ” 1 for all t P rns and
pj,t ” 0 for all j ‰ 1 and all t P rns will achieve a constant regret. Interestingly, in this same range,
the index policy may not be as aggressive. For instance, if k “ pf1 ´ qn we see from (33) that
the index policy sets p1,t “ 1´ {f1 spreading out the selection of a1 values throughout the time
horizon and having a regret of order
?
n.
Lemma 4 (Non-adaptive regret: small budget). For “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u suppose that
kď npf1´ q. Then one has that
V ˚offpn,kq´V ˚napn,kq ď a24 .
1 We say that a function φpnq “Θpψpnqq if there are constants c1, c2, and n0 such that c1 ď φpnqψpnq ď c2 for all ně n0.
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Theorem 3 and Lemma 4 are non-exhaustive. There are ranges of k{n that are covered by
neither. The purpose of these results is to show that while non-adaptivity is not universally bad
(see Lemma 4), there is a non-trivial range of pk,nq pairs for which the regret grows like ?n while
the Budget-Ratio and the dynamic programming policy achieve Op1q regret.
In the proof of Theorem 3 we use three auxiliary lemmas, the first of which provides a lower
bound for the overshoot of a centered Bernoulli random walk.
Lemma 5. Let B1,B2, . . .Bn be independent Bernoulli random variables with success probabilities
q1, q2, . . . , qn, respectively. Let Nn “řtPrnstBt´ qtu and ς2n “VarrNns “řtPrns qtp1´ qtq. Then, for
any Υą 0 there exist constants β1 ” β1pΥq and β2 ” β2pΥq such that
ErpNn´Υςnq`s ě β1ςn´p2` 3
?
2q, Erp´Nn´Υςnq`s ě β1ςn´p2` 3
?
2q, (34)
and
ErpNn`Υςnq2`s ď β2ς2n. (35)
The second auxiliary lemma shows that any good non-adaptive policy must be a perturbation of
the index policy. Specifically, if sjppiq “řtPrns pj,tfj is the expected number of aj candidates that
policy pi selects under infinite budget, then sjppiq is just a perturbation of sj˚ , the solution of the
deterministic relaxation (15).
Lemma 6. Fix M ă8, “ 1
2
mintfm, . . . , f1u, and take any p2minjPrm´1s|aj ´aj`1 |q´2M 2 ď n. If
pi“ tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu is a non-adaptive policy such that
DRpn,kq´V pionpn,kq ďM
?
n,
then
sjppiq “ s˚j ˘t min
jPrm´1s
|aj ´ aj`1 |u´1M?n for all j P rms.
For “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u and pf1` qnď kď p1´ fm´ qn, Lemma 2 tells us that
nf1´ 1
4
ďErZn1 s´ErpZn1 ´ kq`s “ErSn1 s and ErSnms ď 14 .
In words, when k is bounded away from both 0 and n, the offline algorithm selects—in expectation—
all but a constant number of the highest values and at most a constant number of the lowest values.
The optimal non-adaptive policy must do so as well. In particular, it should have in “most” time
periods p1,t “ 1 and pm,t “ 0 so that the marginal probability of selection, qt, is safely bounded
away from zero and from one. The last auxiliary lemma makes this intuitive idea formal.
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Lemma 7. Let  “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u and suppose that pf1 ` qn ď k ď p1´ fm ´ qn. Then,
there is a constant M ”Mp, a1, a2, amq ă8, such that an optimal non-adaptive policy must satisfyÿ
tPrns
1
"
qt ě f1
2
*
ě n´M?n and
ÿ
tPrns
1
"
1´ qt ě fm
2
*
ě n´M?n. (36)
Consequently, ÿ
tPrns
1
"
qt ě f1
2
,1´ qt ě fm
2
*
ě n´ 2M?n,
and one has the lower bound
ς2ppiq “
ÿ
tPrns
qtp1´ qtq ě f1fm
4
pn´ 2M?nq.
5.1. Proof of Theorem 3
For any non-adaptive policy pi “ tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu with associated stopping time ν “
mintr ě 1 : řtPrrsBt or r ě nu, we have that policy pi does not make any selection after time ν,
and we also have that Zνj ď Znj for all j P rms. Thus, if we recall the linear program (2), use the
monotonicity of ϕpz1, . . . , zm, ¨q in pz1, . . . , zmq, and recall the equivalence (1), we obtain that
V pionpn,kq ďErϕpZν1 , . . . ,Zνm, kqs ďErϕpZn1 , . . . ,Znm, kqs “ V ˚offpn,kq.
Furthermore, since ν is the time at which pi exhausts the budget, we also have that
V ˚offpn,kq´V pionpn,kq ěErϕpZn1 , . . . ,Znm, kqs´ErϕpZν1 , . . . ,Zνm, kqs
ě a1 pErmintk,Zn1 us´Ermintk,Zν1 usq
ě a1pErpZn1 ´Zν1 qs´n1pZn1 ą kqsq.
For “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u and pf1 ` qnď k ď p1´ fm ´ qn, Hoeffding’s inequality (see, e.g.
Boucheron et al. 2013, Theorem 2.8) immediately tells us that there is a constant M ”Mpq ă8
such that nPpZn1 ą kq ďM , and Wald’s lemma gives us that
ErZn1 ´Zν1 s “ f1Ern´ νs, (37)
so the proof of the theorem is complete if we can prove an appropriate lower bound for Ern´ νs.
Lemma 3 tells us that for f1 `  ď k{n the index policy has regret that is bounded above pf1 `
q´1a1?n, so that it suffices to consider non-adaptive policies pi “ tpj,t, j P rms and t P rnsu for
which
DRpn,kq´V pionpn,kq ď pf1` q´1a1
?
n.
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If p2q´2M¯ 2 ď n for M¯ “ tminjPrm´1s|aj ´ aj`1 |pf1` qu´1a1, Lemma 6 implies thatÿ
tPrns
pj,tfj “ s˚j ˘ M¯
?
n for all j P rms.
Since
ř
jPrms sj˚ “ k, we also have thatÿ
tPrns
qt “
ÿ
tPrns
ÿ
jPrms
pj,tfj “
ÿ
jPrms
s˚j ˘mM¯
?
n“ k˘mM¯?n. (38)
Furthermore, since 0ďBt ď 1 for all t P rns we know that´ ÿ
tPrns
Bt´ k
¯
`
“
nÿ
t“ν`1
Bt ď n´ ν, so E
”´ ÿ
tPrns
Bt´ k
¯
`
ı
ďErn´ νs. (39)
With ς2ppiq “řtPrns qtp1´qtq, the estimate (38) implies that kďřtPrns qt`rmM¯ςppiq´1?nsςppiq, and
Lemma 7 tells us that there is a constant M ”Mp,m,a1, . . . , amq such that mM¯ςppiq´1?nďM . In
turn, we also have that kďřtPrns qt`Mςppiq, so after we subtract řtPrnsBt on both-sides, change
sign, take the positive part, and recall (39), we obtain the lower bound` ÿ
tPrns
pBt´ qtq´Mςppiq
˘
` ď
` ÿ
tPrns
Bt´ k
˘
` ď n´ ν.
The quantity on the left-hand side is a sum of centered independent Bernoulli random variables
so, when we take expectations, Lemma 5 tells us that there is a constant β1 ” β1p,m,a1, . . . , amq
such that
β1ςppiq´ p2` 3
?
2q ďE
„` ÿ
tPrns
pBt´ qtq´Mςppiq
˘
`

ďErn´ νs.
Plugging this last estimate back into (37) gives us that f1pβ1ςppiq ´ 2´ 3
?
2q ď ErZn1 ´ Zν1 s, and
the theorem then follows after one uses one more time the lower bound for ςppiq given in Lemma
7 and chooses M ”Mp,m,a1, . . . , amq accordingly.
6. Concluding remarks
We have proved that in the multi-secretary problem with independent candidate abilities drawn
from a common finite-support distribution, the regret is constant and achievable by a multi-
threshold policy. In our model, the decision maker knows and makes crucial use of the distribution
of candidate abilities. Two obvious extension to consider are the problem instances in which the
ability distribution is continuous and/or unknown to the decision maker.
While one would like to think of the continuous distribution as a “limit” of discrete ones, our
analysis does build to a great extent on this discreteness, and our bounds depend on the cardinality
of the support. At this point, it is not clear if bounded regret is achievable also with continuous
distributions.
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For the case of unknown distribution, we conjecture that, with a finite support, the regret should
be logarithmic in n. Indeed, consider a “stupid” algorithm that uses the first Oplogpnqq steps to
learn about the distribution (without concern for the objective) and, at the end of the learning
period, computes the threshold and runs with the Budget-Ratio policy thereafter. Simple Chernoff
bounds suggests that the likelihood of mis-estimation should be exponentially small. Coupling this
with the fact that the performance of the BR policy (specifically the fact that Erτ s ě n´M) is
insensitive to small perturbations to the thresholds leads to our conjecture.
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Appendix A: Regret lower bound in Kleinberg’s example
Below we prove the regret lower bound in Lemma 1 in which the ability distribution has support
A“ pa3, a2, a1q and probability mass function p 12`2,2, 12´4q. The argument shows that, because
of the special structure of this example, there are two events (of non-negligible probability)—one
being a perturbation of the other—where the offline sort makes very different choices (taking all
or none of the a2 values) but the optimal dynamic programming policy can do well only in one or
the other but not in both.
Proof of Lemma 1. In what follows we will assume that  is such that 1
2
and 1
22
are integers
so that we can set n “ 12 and k “ n2 “ 122 . This makes the notation cleaner while not changing
any of the arguments. Next, we introduce the following events
A “
"
1

ďZn2 ďmin
 
2Z
n{2
2 ,
2

(*“"1
2
ErZn2 s ďZn2 ďmint2Zn{22 ,ErZn2 su
*
,
H “
"
Zn1 ě k` 2
*
“
"
Zn1 ěErZn1 s` 6
*
, and
L “
"
Zn1 ď k´ 4
*
“
"
Zn1 ďErZn1 s
*
.
On the one hand, on the event H—in particular on H X A—the offline policy takes only the
highest values. That is it only takes a1 values and exhausts the budget k while doing so. On the
other hand, on the event L—in particular on L XA—the offline policy also takes some lower
values. In particular, it takes all of the a1 values, all of the a2 values, and some a3 values to exhaust
the budget. The events HXA and LXA are non-trivial as they happen with probability that
is bounded away from zero: there are constants 0 ą 0 and α ą 0 such that PpH XAq ě α and
PpLXAq ě α for all ď 0. To see this, note that the standard deviation of Zn1 is on the order
of 1{, so the central limit theorem implies that PpHq,PpLq ě α for all  ď 0. Another scaling
argument shows that PpAq ě αą 0 for all ď 0 and for some re-defined αą 0. Since Zn1 and Zn2
are dependent, these observations and a standard condition argument that we omit imply that
there is another α ą 0 such that PpH XAq ě α for all ď 0. A similar analysis also gives that
PpLXAq has the same property.
Next, we consider the random variable Λpn, kq that tracks the difference between the perfor-
mance of the offline policy and that of the dynamic programming policy:
Λpn, kq “ a1pSn1 ´S˚,n1 q` a2pSn2 ´S˚,n2 q` a3pSn3 ´S˚,n3 q,
and we note that the expected value ErΛpn, kqs “ V ˚offpn, kq ´ Vo˚npn, kq is the regret of the
dynamic programming policy. We now recall that S
˚,n{2
2 is the number of a2-selections by the
optimal online policy up to time n{2, and we consider the event
C “ tS˚,n{22 ěZn2 {4u.
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On Cc XLXA, we then have that
ErΛpn, kq1pCc XLXAqs ě a2´ a34 ErZ
n
2 1pCc XLXAqs ě a2´ a34 PpC
c
 XLXAq.
For each sequence tX1, . . . ,Xnu PCXLXA we can now build a sequence in CXHXA by
keeping all the first n{2 values the same and replacing at most 6{ a3-values with a1-values while
keeping the number of a2-values constant, and we call this resulting set D. It is easy to see that
since f3 and f1 are bounded away from zero, then PpDq ě pαPpCXLXAqq for some pαą 0 that
does not depend on . Because the two sequences share the same first n{2 elements we have that
S
˚,n{2
2 ěZn2 {4 also on D. Then
ErΛpn, kq1pDqs ě pa1´ a2qErS˚,n{22 1pDqs ě a1´ a24 ErZ
n
2 1pDqs ě a1´ a24 pαPpCXLXAq.
Since PpCc XLXAq “ PpLXAq´PpCXLXAq, we have that maxtPpCc XLXAq, pαPpCX
LXAqu ě PpLXAqmintpα,1u so that we finally obtain
V ˚offpn, kq´V ˚onpn, kq “ErΛpn, kqs
ěmaxtErΛpn, kq1pCcXLXAqs,ErΛpn, kq1pDqsu
ěmin
"
a2´ a3
4
,
a1´ a2
4
*
maxtPpCc XLXAq, pαPpCXLXAqu
ěmin
"
a2´ a3
4
,
a1´ a2
4
*
mintpα,1uPpLXAq,
so the result follows after one recalls that PpL,Aq ě α and takes Γ “ 14 minta2 ´ a3, a1 ´
a2umintpα,1uα. ˝
Appendix B: Proofs of auxiliary lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2. Since ErBs “ pn and pp` εqnď k, for any uą 0 we have the tail bound
PppB´ kq` ě uq “ PpB´ pně k´ pn`uq ď PpB´ pně εn`uq,
and Hoeffding’s inequality (see, e.g. Boucheron et al. 2013, Theorem 2.8) implies that
PppB´ kq` ě uq ď expt´2ε2n´ 4εu´ 2u2{nu, for all pp` εqnď k.
By integrating both sides for u P r0,8q we then obtain for all pp` εqnď k that
ErpB´ kq`s ď
ż 8
0
PppB´ kq` ě uqduď expt´2ε2nu
ż 8
0
expt´4εuuduď 1
4ε
.
To prove the second bound in (8), one applies the first bound to the binomial random variable
B1 “ n´B and the budget k1 “ n´ k. ˝
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Proof of Lemma 3. The index policy id“ tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu defined by (33) is such that
all values greater than or equal to ajid´1 are selected together with a fraction of the ajid values.
Formally, by Wald’s lemma, we have that
ErSid,νj s “
$’&’%
fjErνs if j ď jid´ 1
pk{n´ F¯ pajidqqErνs if j “ jid
0 if j ě jid` 1,
where Sid,νj “
řν
t“1 σ
id
t 1pXt “ ajq is the number of aj-candidates selected by the index policy by
time ν. Recall that now that for any policy pi we have the inequalities
V pionpn,kq ď V ˚offpn,kq ďDRpn,kq “
jid´1ÿ
j“1
ajfjn` ajidpk´nF¯ pajidqq,
so that
V ˚offpn,kq´V idonpn,kq ďDRpn,kq´V idonpn,kq ď a1Ern´ νs,
and to bound the regret as desired it suffices to obtain an upper bound for Ern´ νs.
Let tBt : t P rnsu be i.i.d Bernoulli random variables with success probability q“řjid´1i“1 fj`k{n´
F¯ pajidq “ k{n. If
Nr “
ÿ
tPrrs
Bt´ qr
is the centered number of candidates the index policy selects by time r, we then have for tě 0 and
q“ k{n that,
n´ ν ě t if and only if Nn´rts ě k´ qpn´ rtsq “ qrts.
In turn, Kolmogorov’s maximal inequality (See, e.g. Billingsley 1995, Theorem 22.4) tells us that
for any tą 0
P
 
n´ ν ě t?n(“ P Nn´rt?ns ě qrt?ns(ď Ppsup
tPrns
|Nt |ě qt?nq ď ErN
2
ns
q2t2n
“ 1´ q
qt2
.
It then follows that
E
„
n´ ν?
n

ď 1`
ż 8
1
Ppn´ ν ě t?nqdyď 1
q
,
so that Ern´ νs ď q´1?nď ε´1?n for any ε P p0,1q and all pairs pn,kq such that εď k{n. ˝
Proof of Lemma 4. The non-adaptive policy ppi that takes all values a1 and rejects all others
achieves bounded regret. To see this, notice that
mÿ
j“2
Snj “
mÿ
j“2
min
 
Znj , pk´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni q`
(“ pk´Zn1 q`.
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Since the random variable Zn1 is Binomial with parameters n,f1, and 0ď kď npf1´q, then Lemma
2 implies that
E
«
mÿ
j“2
Snj
ff
“Erpk´Zn1 q`s ď 14 .
In turn, the value of the offline solution for kď npf1´ q satisfies the bound
V ˚offpn,kq ď a1ErSn1 s` a24 “ a1ErmintZ
n
1 , kus` a24 .
The non-adaptive policy ppi. takes all a1 values and none of the others, until it runs out of budget
at time ν “mintrě 1 :řtPrrsBt ě k or rě nu, so that ErSppi,nj s “ 0 for all j ě 2 and
ErSppi,n1 s “Erÿ
tPrνs
Bt1pXt “ a1qs.
Furthermore, we have that Sppi,n1 “Zn1 if Zn1 ă k, and it equals k otherwise. Thus,
ErSppi,n1 s “ErZν1 s “ErmintZn1 , kus “ErSn1 s,
so we finally have the bound
V ˚offpn,kq´ a24 ď a1ErmintZ
n
1 , kus “ V pionpn,kq,
just as needed. ˝
Proof of Lemma 5. Let Z denote a normal random variable with mean zero and variance 1.
Then,
|ErpNn´Υςnq`s´ ςnErpZ ´Υq`s |ď dW pNn, ςnZq “ sup
hPLip1
|ErhpNnqs´ErhpςnZqs |, (40)
where the Lip1 is the set of Lipschitz-1 functions on R. The random variables B1,B2, . . . ,Bn are
independent Bernoulli with success probabilities q1, q2, . . . , qn so that
Er|Bt´ qt |3s ď 2qtp1´ qtq and ErpBt´ qtq4s ď 2qtp1´ qtq
and ÿ
tPrns
Er|Bt´ qt |3s ď 2ς2n and
ÿ
tPrns
ErpBt´ qtq4s ď 2ς2n.
A version of Stein’s lemma (see, e.g., Ross 2011, Theorem 3.6) for the sum of independent (not
necessarily identically distributed) random variables tells us that
dW pNn{ςn,Zq ď 2
ςn
` 3
?
2
ςn
,
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so by the homogeneity of the distance function dW , we also have that
dW pNn, ςnZq “ ςndW pNn{ςn,Zq ď 2` 3
?
2.
The inequality (40) then implies that
ςnErpZ ´Υq`s´ p2` 3
?
2q ďErpNn´Υςnq`s,
and one can obtain an immediate lower bound for the left-hand side is by
ςnΥPpZ ě 2Υq ď ςnErpZ ´Υq1pZ ě 2Υqs ď ςnErpZ ´Υq`s.
The left inequality in (34) then follows setting β1 “ ΥPpZ ě 2Υq. For the right inequality we
combine the earlier argument with the symmetry of the normal distribution and the Lipschitz-1
continuity of the map x ÞÑ p´x´Υςnq`.
The argument for the second inequality in (35) is standard. Since ErNns “ 0 and ErN 2ns “ ς2n, we
have that
ErpNn`Υςnq2`s ďErpNn`Υςnq2s “ ς2n`Υ2ς2n,
so taking β2 “ 1`Υ2 concludes the proof. ˝
Proof of Lemma 6. Given a non-adaptive policy pi “ tpj,t : j P rms and t P rnsu and a constant
M ă8 we let
M¯ “ M
minjPrm´1s|aj ´ aj`1 | and ι“ arg maxjPrms |sjppiq´ s
˚
j |, (41)
and we show that if
|sιppiq´ s˚ι |“max
jPrms
|sjppiq´ s˚j |ą M¯
?
n, (42)
then
DRpn,kq´V pionpn,kq ąM
?
n.
We let jid P rms be the index such that F¯ pajidq ď k{nă F¯ pajid`1q. There are two cases to consider:
(i) (42) is attained at ιě jid`1 (k{nă F¯ pajidq ă F¯ paιq) in which case 0“ sι˚ ă sιppiq, and (ii) ιď jid
(F¯ paι ď F¯ pajidq ď k{n) in which case 0ă sι˚ and sιppiq ă sι˚ .
We begin with the first case. That is, we assume that (42) is attained for some ιě jid` 1 when
sι˚ “ 0, and we obtain that sιppiq ě sι˚ ` M¯
?
n “ M¯?n. To estimate the gap between DRpn,kq
and V pionpn,kq, consider a version of the deterministic relaxation (15) that requires the selection of
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at least M¯
?
n candidates with ability aι out of the fιn available. Since M¯ ď 2?n we have that
M¯
?
nď fjn for all j P rms, so we write the optimization problem as
DRCpn,k, ιq “ max
s1,...,sm
ÿ
jPrms
ajsj
s.t. 0ď sj ďErZnj s for all j P rms
M¯
?
nď sιÿ
jPrms
sj ď k,
and we obtain that
V pionpn,kq ďDRCpn,k, ιq ďDRpn,kq.
The unique maximizer psˇ1, . . . , sˇmq of DRCpn,k, ιq is given by
sˇj “
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
sj˚ if j ď jid´ 2
sj˚id´1´pM¯
?
n´ sj˚idq` if j “ jid´ 1
psj˚id ´ M¯
?
nq`, if j “ jid
M¯
?
n if j “ ι
0 otherwise,
so that the difference between the value of the deterministic relaxation and the value of its con-
strained version is given by
DRpn,kq´DRCpn,k, ιq “ ajid´1pM¯
?
n´ s˚jidq`` ajidrs˚jid ´ps˚jid ´ M¯
?
nq`s´ aιM¯?n.
Because jid´ 1ă jid ď ι´ 1ă ι, the monotonicity aι ă aι´1 ď ajid ă ajid´1 gives us the lower bound
DRpn,kq´DRCpn,k, ιq ě ajid´1M¯
?
n´ aιM¯?ną raι´1´ aιsM¯?n,
and since V pionpn,kq ďDRCpn,k, ιq we have
DRpn,kq´V pionpn,kq ą raι´1´ aιsM¯
?
n for all ιě jid` 1. (43)
A similar inequality can be obtained for second case in which when (42) is attained at some
index ιď jid. In this case we would consider a version of the deterministic relaxation (15) with the
additional constraint sι ď nfι´M¯?n or sjid ď k´nF¯ pajidq´M¯
?
n. This analysis then implies the
bound
DRpn,kq´V pionpn,kq ą raι´ aι`1sM¯
?
n for all ιď jid,
so if we recall (43) and use the definition of M¯ in (41) we finally obtain that
DRpn,kq´V pionpn,kq ąM
?
n,
concluding the proof of the lemma. ˝
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Proof of Lemma 7. Fix any non-adaptive policy pi PΠna and recall that Spi,ν1 is the number of
a1-candidates that the policy selects. If
ϕ´1pz2, . . . , zm, kq “ max
s2,...,sm
mÿ
j“2
ajsj
s.t. 0ď sj ď zj for all j “ 2, . . . ,m
mÿ
j“2
sj ď k,
then
V pionpn,kq ď a1ErSpi,ν1 s`Erϕ´1pZn2 , . . . ,Znm, k´Spi,ν1 qs. (44)
Since Spi,ν1 ďSn1 “mintZn1 , ku, the monotonicity in k of ϕ´1p¨, kq gives us the upper bound
ϕ´1pZn2 , . . . ,Znm, k´Spi,ν1 q ďϕ´1pZn2 , . . . ,Znm, k´Sn1 q` a2pSn1 ´Spi,ν1 q,
so when we take expectations and recall (44), we obtain that
V pionpn,kq ď a1ErSpi,ν1 s`Erϕ´1pZn2 , . . . ,Znm, k´Sn1 qs` a2pErSn1 s´ErSpi,ν1 sq.
We now note that V ˚offpn,kq “ a1ErSn1 s ` Erϕ´1pZn2 , . . . ,Znm, k ´ Sn1 qs, so when we use this last
decomposition in the displayed equation above we conclude that
V pionpn,kq ď V ˚offpn,kq´ pa1´ a2q pErSn1 s´ErSpi,ν1 sq .
Let M ”Mp, a1, a2q be such that the index policy achieves an pa1´a2qM?n regret (see Lemma
3 with ε“ f1` ). Then, if pi is such that ErSpi,ν1 s ăErSn1 s´M
?
n, then
V pionpn,kq ď V ˚offpn,kq´ pa1´ a2qM
?
n,
so that pi cannot be optimal. In other words, the optimal policy must satisfy
ErSpi,ν1 s ěErSn1 s´M
?
n. (45)
Since pf1` qnď k, we have from Lemma 2 that
ErSn1 s “ErZn1 s´ErpZn1 ´ kq`s ě nf1´ 14 ,
which, together with (45), implies that the optimal non-adaptive policy must haveÿ
tPrns
p1,tf1 ěErSpi,ν1 s ě nf1´ 14 ´M
?
n.
Since p1,tf1 ď qt for all t P rns, it follows that there is another constant M ”Mp, a1, a2q such thatÿ
tPrns
1
"
qt ď f1
2
*
ď
ÿ
tPrns
1
"
p1,t ď 1
2
*
ďM?n,
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concluding the proof of the left inequality of (36).
The argument for the right inequality of (36) is similar. We let
ϕ´mpz1, . . . , zm´1, kq “ max
s1,...,sm´1
m´1ÿ
j“1
ajsj
s.t. 0ď sj ď zj for all j “ 1, . . . ,m´ 1
m´1ÿ
j“1
sj ď k,
and note that
V pionpn,kq ď amErSpi,νm s`Erϕ´1pZn1 , . . . ,Znm, k´Spi,νm qs ď amErSpi,νm s`Erϕ´1pZn1 , . . . ,Znm, kqs.
The decomposition V ˚offpn,kq “Erϕ´mpZn1 , . . . ,Znm´1, kqs` amErSnms, then implies that
V pionpn,kq ď V ˚offpn,kq´ ampErSnms´ErSpi,νm sq.
Here we have that kď p1´fm´ qn so Lemma 2 tells us that ErSnms ď p4q´1 and if M ”Mp, amq
is the constant such that the index policy achieves amM
?
n regret, then we see that policy pi cannot
be optimal if ErSpi,νm s ąM
?
n. Since p1´ pm,tqfm ď 1´ qt, this observation then gives us another
constant M ”Mp, amq such thatÿ
tPrns
1
"
1´ qt ď fm
2
*
ď
ÿ
tPrns
1
"
1´ pm,t ď 1
2
*
“
ÿ
tPrns
1
"
pm,t ě 1
2
*
ďM?n,
which completes the proof. ˝
Appendix C: The dynamic programming formulation
Let v`pw,κq denote the expected total ability when ` candidates are yet to be inspected (the are
` “periods” to-go), the current level of accrued ability is w, and at most κ can be selected (κ is
the residual recruiting budget). The sequence of functions tv` :R`ˆZ`ÑR` for 1ď `ă8u then
satisfy the Bellman recursion
v`pw,κq “
ÿ
jPrms
maxtv`´1pw` aj, κ´ 1q, v`´1pw,κqufj, (46)
with the boundary conditions
v0pw,κq “w for all κ PZ`, and wě 0 and v`pw,0q “w for all ` P rns and wě 0.
If n is the number of available candidates and k is the initial recruiting budget, the optimality
principle of dynamic programming then implies that
V ˚onpn,kq “ vnp0, kq for all n,k PZ`.
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The Bellman equation (46) implies that the optimal online policy takes the form of a threshold
policy, and the next proposition proves that the optimal thresholds depend only on the residual
budget, κ, and not on the accrued ability w.
Proposition 5 (State-space Reduction). Let tg` : Z`Ñ R` for 1 ď ` ă8u satisfy the recur-
sion
g`pκq “
ÿ
jPrms
maxtaj ` g`´1pκ´ 1q, g`´1pκqufj, (47)
with the boundary conditions
g0pκq “ 0 for al κ PZ` and g`p0q “ 0 for all 1ď `ă8. (48)
Then,
v`pw,κq “w` g`pκq for all w PR` and κ PZ`. (49)
Consequently, with ` periods to-go and a residual budget of κ, it is optimal to select a candidate
with ability aj if and only if
aj ě h`pκq ” g`´1pκq´ g`´1pκ´ 1q.
Under the optimal online policy, ability levels strictly smaller than h`pκq are skipped and the rest
are selected. Since the Markov decision problem (MDP) associated with the Bellman equation (47)
is a finite-horizon problem with finite state space and a finite number of actions, this deterministic
policy is also optimal within the larger class of non-anticipating policies (See, e.g. Bertsekas and
Shreve 1978, Corollary 8.5.1.).
Proof of Proposition 5. This is an induction proof. For `“ 1, we have by (46) that
v1pw,0q “w and v1pw,κq “w`
ÿ
jPrms
ajfj “w`ErX1s for all κě 1.
Taking
g1pκq “
#
0 if κ“ 0
ErX1s if κě 1,
one has that
v1pw,κq “w` g1pκq for all wě 0 and all κ PZ`.
Next, as induction hypothesis suppose that we have the decomposition
v`´1pw,κq “w` g`´1pκq for all wě 0 and all κ PZ`.
If κ“ 0 the decomposition is satisfied with g`p0q “ 0 and
v`pw,0q “w` g`p0q “w. (50)
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For κě 1, the Bellman equation (46) and the induction assumption imply
v`pw,κq “w`
ÿ
jPrms
maxtaj ` v`´1pw` aj, κ´ 1q´w´ aj, v`´1pw,κq´wufj
“w`
ÿ
jPrms
maxtaj ` g`´1pκ´ 1q, g`´1pκqufj.
Defining recursively
g`pκq “
ÿ
jPrms
maxtaj ` g`´1pκ´ 1q, g`´1pκqufj for all κě 1,
we then have together with (50) that (49) holds for all wě 0 and all κ P Z`. From this argument
it also follows that g`pκq satisfy the recursion (47) with the boundary condition (48). ˝
Appendix D: Deterministic relaxation revisited
The subset T 1 is identified by taking 0ă 1 ă “ 1
2
mintfm, fm´1, . . . , f1u, and letting
T 1 “ tpn,kq P T : F¯ pajq` 1 ď k{nď F¯ paj`1q´ 1 for some j P rmsu.
Proposition 6 (Deterministic Relaxation Gap). There exists a constant M ”
Mp,m,am, am´1, . . . , a1q such that
0ďDRpn,kq´V ˚offpn,kq ďM
?
n for pn,kq P T .
Furthermore,
0ďDRpn,kq´V ˚offpn,kq ď a1m41 for pn,kq P T
1.
The proof of Proposition 6 requires the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 8. There exists a constant M ”Mp,m,am, am´1, . . . , a1q such that, for all j P rms,
ErSnj s “E
«
min
!
Znj ,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni
¯
`
)ff
“min
#
ErZnj s,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
ErZni s
¯
`
+
˘M?n.
In turn,
ErSnj s “ s˚j ˘M
?
n, for all j P rms.
Proof. Let ξnj “Znj ´ErZnj s for all j P rms and obtain the representation
min
!
Znj ,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni
¯
`
)
“min
!
ErZnj s` ξnj ,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
ErZni s´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
ξni
¯
`
)
.
For any real numbers a, b, c, d, we have that
minta,maxtc,0uu´ | b |´ |d |ďminta` b,maxtc` d,0uu ďminta,maxtc,0uu` | b |` |d |,
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so that by setting, a“ErZnj s, b“ ξnj , c“ k´
ř
iPrj´1sErZni s, d“´
ř
iPrj´1s ξ
n
i , and taking expecta-
tions, we have
E
«
min
!
Znj ,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni
¯
`
)ff
“E
«
min
!
ErZnj s,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
ErZni s
¯
`
)ff
˘
ÿ
iPrjs
Er| ξni |s.
For the random variables Zn1 , . . . ,Z
n
m we have VarrZnj s “Erpξnj q2s “ nfjp1´ fjq for all j P rms, and
by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
E
«
min
!
Znj ,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni
¯
`
)ff
“E
«
min
!
ErZnj s,
´
k´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
ErZni s
¯
`
)ff
˘
ÿ
iPrjs
a
nfip1´ fiq,
and the result follows by setting M “řjPrmsafjp1´ fjq. ˝
Proof of Proposition 6. The first part follows immediately from Lemma 8. Next, for pn,kq P
T 1 and jid be the index such that F¯ pajidq ď k{n ă F¯ pajid`1q, the optimal solution (16) of the
deterministic relaxation DRpn,kq is given by
s˚j “
$’&’%
ErZnj s if j ď jid´ 1
k´řiPrj´1sErZni s if j “ jid
0 otherwise.
(51)
To estimate the deterministic-relaxation gap when pn,kq P T 1 it suffices to study the differences
sj˚ ´ErSnj s “ ErZnj ´Snj s for j ď jid ´ 1 and sj˚id ´ErSnjids “ Erk´
ř
iPrjid´1sZ
n
i ´Snjids. Recalling
the definition of Snj in (3) we have
0ďZnj ´Snj ď
#
0 if k´řiPrj´1sZni ěZnjř
iPrjsZ
n
i ´ k if k´
ř
iPrj´1sZ
n
i ăZnj .
In particular,
0ďZnj ´min
 
Znj , pk´
ÿ
iPrj´1s
Zni q`
(ď ´ ÿ
iPrjs
Zni ´ k
¯
`
.
Taking expectations on both sides, and recalling (51) for j ď jid´ 1, we have
0ď s˚j ´ErSnj s ďE
”´ ÿ
iPrjs
Zni ´ k
¯
`
ı
.
For such j ď jid ´ 1 the sum řiPrjsZni is a Binomial random variable with n trials and success
probability F¯ paj`1q ď F¯ pajidq, so because pn,kq P T 1 and pF¯ pajidq ` 1qn ď k, we obtain from (8)
that
s˚j “ErSnj s˘ 141 , for all j ď jid´ 1. (52)
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Similarly,
tk´
ÿ
iPrjid´1s
Zni u´Snjid “maxtk´
ÿ
iPrjids
Zni ,mint0, k´
ÿ
iPrjid´1s
Zni uu,
so we have the two inequalities
min
#
0, k´
ÿ
iPrjid´1s
Zni
+
ď
#
k´
ÿ
iPrjid´1s
Zni
+
´Snjid ďmax
#
k´
ÿ
iPrjids
Zni ,0
+
.
Here, the two sums
ř
iPrjid´1sZ
n
i and
ř
iPrjidsZ
n
i are again Binomial random variables with n trials
and success probabilities given, respectively, by F¯ pajidq and F¯ pajid`1q. Taking expectations and
using F¯ pajidq` 1 ď k{nď F¯ pajid`1q´ 1, Lemma 2 guarantees that
´ 1
41
ď k´
ÿ
iPrjid´1s
ErZni s´ErSnjids ď
1
41
.
In turn, the representation (51) for sj˚id implies that
s˚jid “ErSnjids˘
1
41
. (53)
Combining the estimates (52) and (53) then give us that
DRpn,kq´V ˚offpn,kq ď a1m41 for all pn,kq P T
1,
just as needed to complete the proof of the proposition. ˝
